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Abstract:  Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument 
for considering the fish as a sentient being. This becomes more important for animal ethical 
discussion as the fish becomes a more important and legitimate animal model for investigating 
animal states and traits associated with higher levels of behavior such as learning and memory. 
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Animal models are typically used to characterize various human disorders and to provide 
preclinical or translational guides for the discovery of appropriate therapies. A good animal model 
may exhibit face validity, predictive validity, or construct validity if, respectively, the animal 
presents with symptoms like those in the human condition, the animal responds to drugs or 
interventions as the human does, and similar mechanisms can explain the animal and human 
symptoms and/or their response to a medication or therapy.  
The animal model researcher uses a minimalist approach: an animal that is adequate to 
run a set of experiments yielding meaningful results. The animal should be suited to run tests in 
a context it can negotiate and in which it has various options to which it can respond. The 
researcher is also concerned with having at least some level of neuroanatomical, 
neurophysiological and neurochemical homologies that allow for appropriate comparisons to the 
human condition. One could argue that the animal does not need to be sentient to react to certain 
conditions in an experimental context, yet this argument falls apart when the experimental 
context presents contingencies that the animal must weigh to make choices which require 
subjective awareness. Fish or other animals serving as models may not understand reasons for 
being placed into experimental contexts, yet they are able to negotiate choices placed before 
them and they generally adapt to experimental contexts if needed. The animal, then, must 
understand at some level that it is separate from the context with which it must negotiate. This 
distinction would at least imply sentience on behalf of the negotiator.    
In Summary 2.3, Woodruff (2017) states, simply and elegantly, that the brain structural 
criteria for sentience are just that – criteria – not sentience itself. He includes a nice logical 
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progression of arguments to conclude that the fish optic tectum meets criteria as a physical 
substrate for sentience which he breaks down nicely with the archer fish example, a map of the 
visual world as background with neuronal capacity for attention to stimuli that differ from the 
background map or template.  
Critics of this hypothesis attempt to equate neural structures of so-called lower 
vertebrates with those of mammals without matching animal agendas with their brain structures. 
Nature is logical in that animals are not strapped with unnecessary equipment that they may not 
use in their environments. Animals are equipped so that they can navigate efficiently and procure 
from their environments what they need to survive and propagate. Fish and mammals certainly 
have different agendas in handling their environments for the necessities of survival.  
Researchers have debated whether rodents have a prefrontal cortex (PFC) at all because 
theirs is agranular and amorphic relative to higher mammals (Preuss, 1995). Does this mean they 
do not have a PFC or that the area we are trying to homologize is just different and sufficient to 
deal with rodents’ agendas? With technological advances, it has become apparent that mouse 
PFC is differentiated for various functional roles. It is interconnected with various subcortical 
regions not previously considered, such as the amygdala, a circuitry important in associative 
memories that allow animals to approach or avoid situations well enough to promote survival, 
etc. Woodruff extends this structural reasoning to the fish tectum and pallidum using the 
excellent work with goldfish from the researchers at the Universidad de Sevilla concerning 
DM/amygdala and DL/hippocampus homologies. Here, a normal fish can perform adequately in 
a shuttle box avoidance paradigm that requires the subjective sense of fear, yet the DM-lesioned 
fish cannot. Similarly, the performance of DL-lesioned fish in declarative memory paradigms such 
as an allocentric spatial learning task is impaired. 
Creson et al. (2003) used a Poeciliid (black molly) animal model to show that lithium 
administration compromises cognitive processes. With a convertible T/+ water maze, we showed 
that working memory (spontaneous alternation) and spatial memory (rewarded place test) were 
compromised by lithium in a dose-dependent fashion.  Although these fish did have limitations in 
their capacity to perform variants of these tests, they provided a useful animal model to answer 
questions driven by hypothesis-based testing. The egocentric and temporal nature of the working 
memory task, as well as the allocentric and temporal nature of the spatial task, required the fish 
to be conscious of their place whether using proprioceptive cues or cues distinct from themselves 
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On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and 
Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU Animal Studies will 
host a conference on Animal Consciousness. 
 
This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss 
questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish feel pain? Are non-
human mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does 
research on animal consciousness affect the ethical treatment of animals? What 
is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness 




Speakers and panelists include: 
  
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of 
Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology),  
Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland, 
Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts, 
Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience),  
Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney, 
Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary 
Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel 
Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter, 
Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy) 
 
 
Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao. 
 
The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E 
8th St).  
 
Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”, “Do fish feel pain?”, and “Animal consciousness 
and ethics”.  
 
Saturday sessions will include “Animal self-consciousness”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel 
discussion.  
 
A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date. 
 
Registration is free but required.  
 
Register here.  
 
See also the conference website. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
